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101 
Competition Policy, Consumer Protection, and 
Economic Disadvantage† 
William E. Kovacic∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2007, the People’s Republic of China adopted its first 
competition law and joined a roster of over 100 nations that have 
enacted competition statutes. Until recent decades, the majority of 
these jurisdictions, like China, had relied entirely or completely on 
central planning to organize their economies. Judging from the status 
of current competition law drafting projects, the list seems likely to 
grow by a few countries each year. 
For those of us of a certain age, these events are most improbable. 
An episode from my undergraduate years in the early 1970s suggests 
why this is so. My study of economics began with the traditional 
introductory survey course. The required readings included The 
Great Ascent,1 Robert Heilbroner’s influential analysis of economic 
development. Heilbroner admonished countries with democratic 
political institutions and market economies to accept the inevitability 
that central planning was the only suitable course for what were 
called Third World nations to achieve substantial economic growth.2  
My instructor wrote his Ph.D dissertation for Heilbroner and 
revered his advisor’s views. The final examination included a 
heavily-weighted question that directed students to discuss the most 
 
 † This Essay was prepared from a speech originally delivered in October 2006 at 
Washington University in St. Louis School of Law as part of the 2006–2007 Public Interest 
Speaker Series.  
 ∗  Commissioner, U.S. Federal Trade Commission. On leave from the George 
Washington University Law School. The views expressed here are the author’s alone. 
 1. ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE GREAT ASCENT: THE STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN OUR TIME (Harper Collins, 1963). 
 2. Id. at 148–49. 
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likely and beneficial path for economic development in the Third 
World for the remainder of the twentieth century. I told the examiner 
exactly what he wanted to hear and stepped three favorably-graded 
credits closer to the baccalaureate degree. 
I sometimes wonder what would have happened if had written 
something along the following lines on that examination in 1971: “By 
the year 2000 the Soviet Union will dissolve. Its former republics and 
the nations of what we now call the Warsaw Pact will embrace 
sweeping, market-oriented reforms. The Berlin Wall will fall by the 
end of the 1980s and the two Germanys will be unified under the 
liberal political and economic institutions of West Germany. The 
European Union soon will enlarge its membership to add countries as 
Hungary and Poland, as well as newly independent states such as 
Estonia, Lithuania, and Slovenia. Greater reliance on market-based 
economic systems also will encompass numerous countries in Africa, 
Asia, the Indian Subcontinent, and Latin America. Among these will 
be South Africa, which will undergo a largely peaceful handover of 
political power to the nonwhite majority and will enact a new 
competition law. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam, which by the 
mid-1970s will prevail in the war the United States, will use market 
reforms to spur growth in the 1990s and will welcome the restoration 
of diplomatic relations with the United States, and the opening of a 
U.S. embassy in Hanoi, by the decade’s end. And China will 
transform its economy with market reforms. Only a few states will 
sustain an adamantine, inflexible opposition to capitalism.” 
Had I said so, I strongly suspect I would have failed the course. 
One did not have to be an admirer of Heilbroner in 1971 to regard 
this forecast as delusional. At the time it would have been reasonable 
to interpret my hypothetical predications as a certifying mark of an 
inability to understand how the history and political science of the 
twentieth century ensured that such a scenario could not come to 
pass.  
The modern embrace of market-oriented reforms, including the 
widespread adoption of competition laws, is one of the most 
remarkable stories of our time. But the narrative is by no means 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol25/iss1/7
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finished. There is an active debate about whether the market reforms 
of recent decades have set out the right path for economic progress.3  
The debate over market reforms in formerly planned economies 
has raised three basic questions about competition law and its place 
in market reform.4 First, is competition law a distraction from more 
urgent reform priorities? Does the creation of a competition policy 
system wrongly divert attention from the development of other 
institutions that (e.g., mechanisms that facilitate the creation and 
enforcement of commercial contracts) make stronger contributions to 
economic growth?  
Second, are competition laws modeled on the statutes of countries 
with well-established market economies prone to misapplication in 
the circumstances in which most transition countries will implement 
them? For example, will merger control provisions or controls on 
abusive behavior by dominant enterprises inevitably become 
mechanisms by which frail and politically buffeted competition 
agencies reestablish the type of state orchestration of the economy 
that market reforms were designed to eliminate? 
The third question is whether the market rivalry that competition 
laws seek to stimulate makes truly useful contributions to economic 
development.5 Does the implementation of a competition law help 
reduce poverty? Or does the execution of the competition law in a 
transition economy become little more than an exercise by which 
elites in the civil serve and the private sector shuffle paper with little 
concern for the alleviation of economic misery?  
This Essay discusses how well-conceived competition policies can 
serve the poor and reduce barriers that reinforce economic 
 
 3. Extensive treatments of this issue appear in TOWARD PRO-POOR POLICIES: AID, 
INSTITUTIONS, AND GLOBALIZATION (Bertil Tungodden et al. eds., 2003). 
 4. See William E. Kovacic, Institutional Foundations for Economic Legal Reform in 
Transition Economies: The Case of Competition Policy and Antitrust Enforcement, 77 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 265, 286–301 (2001) (discussing debate over value of competition law as law 
reform ingredient in transition economies). 
 5. For an excellent discussion of the place of competition law as an instrument of 
poverty reduction in developing countries, see Eleanor M. Fox, Economic Development, 
Poverty, and Antitrust: The Other Path, 13 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 211 (2007). 
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disadvantage.6 It first identifies some of the phenomena that 
competition policy programs usefully can address to improve the 
welfare of economically disadvantaged populations. The Essay then 
describes how consumer protection programs can complement 
competition policy measures by punishing and deterring serious 
fraud. The paper concludes with reflections on the broader 
contributions to social welfare that competition and consumer 
protection programs can offer. In addressing these topics I have 
sought to draw upon examples from my own experiences in the 
United States and in technical assistance projects. 
II.  COMPETITION POLICY AND POVERTY REDUCTION 
In reviewing experience with well-established market systems and 
transition economies, I am struck by the number of ways in which 
programs to curb private and public trade restraints can deliver 
special benefits to poor populations. In this section I discuss several 
categories of initiatives that can help serve the aims of poverty 
reduction and otherwise improving the well-being of a nation’s less 
affluent citizens.  
In reviewing these topics, I make two basic assumptions about 
economic development. The first is that entrepreneurial DNA is 
spread randomly across the world’s population and across the 
political subdivisions of a single jurisdiction. No single nation, state, 
province, or municipality receives an unusual endowment. 
Jurisdictions that place the fewest artificial impediments in the path 
of people who have that DNA are likely to prosper more than others. 
This is especially true in the case of new business development by 
individuals who are seeking to form and operate businesses in 
conditions of poverty. 
My second assumption is that work—the process of earning a 
living—can give us a great sense of personal fulfillment. Conceiving 
a new idea for a product, finding a better way to provide a service, 
teaching a good class, or countless other activities that we place in 
 
 6. By “competition policies,” I mean a mix of instruments that includes law enforcement, 
advocacy before other public agencies, education, and research. The successful competition 
agency should have and use all of these tools. 
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the category of work can be profoundly creative forms of expression. 
A society that places the fewest unnecessary barriers in the path of 
the realization of these talents is likely not only to be more 
prosperous but might achieve higher levels of personal satisfaction, 
as well.  
A. Focal Points for Competition Law Enforcement and Advocacy 
In the discussion below, I focus on areas in which increased 
competition and the removal of artificial barriers to the entry of new 
entrepreneurs and the expansion of small enterprises can general 
particularly strong benefits for the economically disadvantaged. 
Economic performance in areas such as communications, public 
procurement, and transport affect the lives of consumers in 
immediate and observable ways, and the success of existing or 
prospective business ventures depends heavily on them. Reduce the 
cost or improve the quality of services in any of these sectors, and 
you are likely to realize greater economy-wide productivity and 
witness gains in consumer well-being. 
1. Public Procurement 
One of the most important contributions of competition policy to 
poverty reduction is the deterrence of supplier collusion in public 
procurement.7 Even small improvements in the performance of public 
procurement programs can yield large social benefits, especially for 
the least affluent citizens. Public procurement outlays account for just 
under twenty percent of GDP in the United States; in formerly 
planned economies, the state’s share can exceed fifty percent. Many 
of these expenditures are for infrastructure and social services that are 
 
 7. See William E. Kovacic et al., Bidding Rings and the Design of Anti-Collusive 
Measures for Auctions and Procurements, in HANDBOOK OF PROCUREMENT 381 (Nicola 
Dimitri et al. eds., 2006) (discussing harm caused by collusion targeted at public authorities); 
Robert D. Anderson & William E. Kovacic, Address at the International Conference on Public 
Procurement: Global Revolution III: Good Governance in Public Procurement Markets: The 
Complementary Roles of Competition Policy and Trade Liberalization (Dec. 2007) (examining 
value of competition policy in discouraging collusion in public tenders). 
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designed in large measure to assist economically disadvantaged 
populations.  
In many of the world’s economies, cartels and bid-rigging 
arrangements in the construction sector have dramatically raised the 
cost of building roads and hospitals and have increased the price that 
public agencies must pay to provide services such as meals for school 
children.8 Cartel overcharges can account for ten or more of the total 
value of a specific procurement.9 Well-established market economies 
such as the Netherlands and the United States and transition 
economies such as Hungary and Mexico have assigned a high priority 
to challenging such arrangements. Even dollar saved by deterring 
procurement cartels is an additional dollar that can improve the lot of 
intended beneficiaries. 
An important side effect of the enforcement of competition laws is 
to discourage fraud in public procurement.10 A number of 
competition laws contain provisions that either bar public authorities 
from giving exclusive licenses or no-bid contracts to business 
managers or require approval for such arrangements from the head of 
state or the national legislature. By limiting the ability of a 
procurement official to deliver on a promise to provide valuable 
contracts in return for a bribe, these restrictions can make it more 
difficult to execute corrupt agreements. Given the amount of public 
expenditures that are intended in principal to serve poorer citizens, a 
reduction in bribery can help the state get greater benefits for its 
poverty reduction programs. 
2. Transportation 
Few areas of economic activity are more important to national 
prosperity than the networks that transport people and goods 
throughout a jurisdiction. Examples from my experience in Morocco 
in the 1990s illustrate the point. The first involved the ornamental 
 
 8. See Gian Luigi Albano et al., Preventing Collusion in Procurement, in HANDBOOK OF 
PROCUREMENT 347, 347–48 (Nicola Dimitri et al. eds., 2006) (discussing overcharges in 
construction procurements). 
 9. See John M. Connor, Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International 
Cartels, 6 J. IND. COMPET. TRADE 195 (2006) (discussing harm imposed by cartels). 
 10. See Kovacic, Institutional Foundations, supra note 4, at 296–97. 
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flower market. The growing of ornamental flowers had become a 
promising area of new entrepreneurship in Morocco, with Europe 
providing the main source of demand. Researchers found that the 
growers, many of them small enterprises, faced at least three serious 
obstacles in getting their products to European destinations.  
The first was a transport cartel. The trucking operators who 
carried the flowers from the farms to Morocco’s main airports in 
Casablanca and Rabat colluded in setting their rates. The second was 
a cartel of freight forwarders who packaged and processed shipments 
at the airports. The third obstacle consisted of government policies 
that limited the number of air carriers that served European cities. 
This three-stage system of restrictions artificially raised the delivered 
price of the flowers and reduced the sales that Moroccan growers 
otherwise would have achieved.  
In jurisdictions such as Indonesia and Mexico, one of the greatest 
sources of improved economic performance has been the introduction 
of competition into the commercial airline sector. Mexico is a large 
country. Until recently, a state-owned enterprise provided all 
domestic service. The incumbent carrier’s high rates meant that only 
comparatively wealthy business operators or individual citizens could 
fly. Owing to the advocacy of the Competition Commission of 
Mexico (CCM), the country chose to permit new carriers to compete 
for service on domestic routes. Competition has reduced fares and 
improved service. This increases the ability of business managers to 
visit suppliers and customers. With lower fares, Mexican citizens can 
take airplanes when the only affordable way to make a long journey 
to visit friends or families within the country was an unspeakably 
difficult bus ride. 
3. Banking 
Another example concerns the banking sector. We interviewed 
representatives of Morocco’s major banks and learned how the banks 
set interest rates for savings accounts and loans. Every week or so, 
representatives of the principal banks would meet and agree about the 
rates to be paid to depositors and the rates to be charged to borrowers. 
Not only did the banks agree not to compete to persuade individual 
consumers to create savings accounts, they also artificially raised the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 101 Kovacic book pages.doc  5/23/2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 25:101 
 
 
rates that commercial firms—including small business operators—
would have to pay to obtain loans.  
Direct controls on the formation of new businesses tend to be still 
more severe in the case of financial services. In many cases in 
transition economies, these controls go well beyond the prudential 
requirements that most jurisdictions impose to ensure the integrity of 
the banking system. Too often the excessive restrictions seek to 
protect incumbent enterprises, especially state-owned institutions, as 
an end in itself. This diminishes rivalry in the provision of financial 
services, including competition to devise lending terms and 
instruments of interest to new or small enterprises. 
Our project in Vietnam showed how unnecessary restrictions on 
entry into financial services harms the owners of small enterprises. It 
is possible for small firms to enter and enjoy some measure of 
success without recourse to such basic financing tools as a line of 
credit from a bank. An entrepreneur can accumulate funds to get 
started from family members, friends, and customers. These means 
can help raise perhaps a hundred thousand dollars or more, but they 
are inadequate to obtain the million-dollar loan that permits a 
significant expansion of operations. 
We spoke in Hanoi to the owner of a small shop that had repaired 
and refurbished bicycles. His experience had taught him a great deal 
about the design of bicycles, and his aim was to build his own 
production facility. He unsuccessfully sought loans from the 
incumbent state-owned banks, which expressed concern about 
annoying the existing state-owned bicycle producers, which were 
clients of the banks. One cannot be sure that a more competitive 
banking sector would have provided this entrepreneur a loan, but it is 
certain that the existing configuration of banks would not. 
4. Professional Services 
Most jurisdictions regulate entry into and participation in 
professions such as law and medicine. There is broad agreement that 
some level of public intervention is necessary to certify qualifications 
and to ensure that the providers of professional services give truthful, 
comprehensible information to the typical layperson client. Many 
jurisdictions, acting through public agencies or professional 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol25/iss1/7
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associations, have used concerns about quality control to prohibit all 
advertising for professional services, to bar price competition, and to 
impede the use of trained para-professionals to perform various 
tasks.11 
The restrictions recited above have the tendency to raise the price 
and limit the availability of the services in question. For the higher 
range of the income distribution, these affects may be annoying but 
they are tolerable. Individuals with means can afford to pay the 
additional cost of a routine fluoride treatment or a real estate closing. 
For the poor, the price increases that result from unnecessary 
restrictions put the services out of reach, even in jurisdictions that 
provide some form of public assistance or impose obligations on 
members of a profession to offer services free of charge to those in 
need.  
A substantial body of empirical literature shows that policies that 
permit truthful advertising and price competition substantially reduce 
the price of such services without a reduction in quality for clients. 
Increased competition not only has reduced prices but also has 
stimulated innovations in service design and delivery. These changes 
have society-wide benefits, and they are particularly significant for 
lower income individuals. 
An example from recent FTC experience illustrates the point. 
Early in this decade, the South Carolina legislature adopted a statute 
to increase the ability of public school systems in the South Carolina 
to have dental hygienists provide fluoride treatments and other forms 
of preventive dental care to students.12 The student population in the 
schools in question consisted heavily of children from families with 
low incomes. Many of these children were African American. 
Despite the reform legislation, the South Caroline State Board of 
Dentistry sought to impose a requirement that a dentist examine each 
student before the paraprofessional applied the fluoride treatment. 
Fulfillment of such a mandate would dramatically have reduced the 
 
 11. See William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy Research and Development, Institutional 
Interdependency, and the Future Work of Competition Agencies in the Professions, in 
EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW 2004: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPETITION LAW AND 
THE (LIBERAL) PROFESSIONS 547 (Claus Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela Atanasiu eds., 2006).  
 12. In re South Carolina State Board of Dentistry, D.9311 (July 30, 2004), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9311/040728commissionopinion.pdf. 
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number of students who could receive preventive dental care. The 
FTC successfully challenged the State Board’s policy on the ground 
that it contradicted a state law that authorized fluoride treatments 
without the immediate supervision of a dentist. The Commission 
emphasized that adherence to the State Board’s policy would have 
denied the students treatments without ensuring attainment of any 
quality of service objective. 
5. Incorporation and Licensing Requirements 
In the 1990s Vietnam’s companies law supplied an imposing 
barrier to the incorporation of new firms. In the United States and 
many other countries, the establishment of a new company requires 
the payment of a modest fee and the filing of a simple registration 
form that lists the name, address, and directors of the new enterprise. 
Vietnam’s registration process required the applicant to identify the 
nature of its intended line of work and to present a summary of its 
business plan. Members of the ministry responsible for registration 
and of Vietnam’s Socialist Party would review the application and 
evaluate, among other matters, the need for the establishment of the 
applicant’s enterprise and the wisdom of the business plan.  
The reviewers were likely to deny the application in two 
circumstances. The first was when the applicant sought to enter a line 
of commerce already occupied by other firms, especially one or more 
of Vietnam’s state-owned enterprises. In such cases, the 
establishment of a new firm would be considered “redundant” and 
therefore “unnecessary.” The second circumstance was that the 
reviewers perceived no value in the proposed business plan or 
thought the applicant incapable of conducting the business 
successfully. If the ministry officials and party members thought the 
business planned to offer something that Vietnamese citizens would 
not care to purchase or did not need, they would disapprove the 
application. As part of a major retooling of the companies law, 
Vietnam abandoned these restrictions and put the country’s 
registration on largely the same footing that one sees in older market 
economies. 
I sometimes have tried to imagine how the application of 
Vietnam’s now-forsaken business registration screens might have 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol25/iss1/7
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affected the development of the U.S. economy. Two examples come 
to mind from the 20th century. The first will perhaps be familiar to 
those who have lived in the St. Louis area or studied the history of 
the American aerospace sector. In the late 1930s James McDonnell 
set out to establish a producer of aircraft parts and subassemblies in 
St. Louis. The field already was occupied by a number of prominent 
private companies, such as Boeing, Curtiss-Wright, Grumman, and 
Lockheed, and government-owned design bureaus at that time played 
a major part in the design and development of combat aircraft. 
McDonnell eventually approached James McRoberts, the namesake 
of a St. Louis law firm and asked him to incorporate his new firm. 
Apologizing that he could not compensate McRoberts or his firm 
lavishly for this service, McDonnell said he would remember their 
generosity if things turned out well. And well they turned out. 
McRoberts filed the simple incorporation documents for the 
McDonnell Aircraft Company in Maryland and began a relationship 
that served the engineer and his outside counsel splendidly for 
decades to come. 
Suppose that, instead of using the quick and austere registration 
process for the State of Maryland, the incorporation laws had obliged 
James McRoberts to show that his client’s idea was neither redundant 
nor improvident. A redundancy check might have knocked 
McDonnell out because significant incumbent private firms and 
government-owned bodies already occupied the field amid a 
catastrophic economic depression. However energetic, hard-working, 
and determined the creator of the proposed McDonnell Aircraft 
Company might have seemed, the registration committee might have 
concluded that he was not up to the job and ought to be apply his 
talents in other pursuits. It would have appeared improbable that the 
proposed enterprise, which would being its operations by serving as a 
mere subcontractor to the well-known system integrators of the time, 
someday would design and produce, among others, the Phantoms, 
Eagles, Hornets, and Mercury spacecraft that would become legends 
in America’s aerospace history.13  
 
 13. On the history of the McDonnell Aircraft Company and its successor enterprise, 
McDonnell Douglas, see BILL YENNE, MCDONNELL DOUGLAS—A TALE OF TWO GIANTS 
(1985); William E. Kovacic, Transatlantic Turbulence: The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas 
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The second story begins with a photograph taken in the mid-1970s 
in New Mexico of the employees of a newly-formed business called 
Microsoft. The clothing and grooming styles are heavily influenced 
by counter-cultural impulses. One co-founder—the person whose 
name would become most closely associated with the enterprise—
looks exceedingly young.14 The proposed Microsoft Company easily 
could have failed a pre-reform Vietnamese registration process. In a 
world of IBM, it would be easy to classify the new venture into the 
computer sector as redundant. And the registration committee might 
have doubted that the odd collection of entrepreneurs would carry 
this off, much less aspire to surpass IBM and countless other 
corporate luminaires and become the most-heavily capitalized 
enterprise on the planet before the century came to a close. 
6. Tax Policy 
A jurisdiction’s rules that govern the formation of a company are 
only some of the many ways in which the state determines how 
readily new entrepreneurs—especially prospective business owners 
with limited means—can try their ideas in the marketplace. Tax 
policy is another. When the state sets extraordinarily tax rates on 
business earnings, entrepreneurs have strong incentives to operate in 
the shadow of the law in what is called the “informal sector.” By 
choosing to operate in the informal sector, business operators escape 
high tax rates but forfeit recourse to legal protections, such as 
recourse to the courts to enforce contracts and access to capital 
formation tools that are sanctioned by law, that are available to 
properly registered companies. To the extent that poorly conceived 
tax and regulatory policies drive entrepreneurs to the informal sector, 
economic development will be less robust than it would be otherwise. 
In the late 1990s, I saw this difficulty firsthand in the course of a 
competition policy reform project in Benin. Our research team 
interviewed the owner of an photocopying shop in Cotonou. We 
 
Merger and International Competition Policy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 805 (2001). The Boeing 
Company acquired McDonnell Douglas in 1997.  
 14. Bill Gates recounts some of his experiences in the formation and growth of Microsoft 
in BILL GATES, THE ROAD AHEAD (1995). 
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entered what seemed to be the main working area of the shop, which 
contained a small number of copiers and other machines in obvious 
disrepair. We asked the owner how his business survived. He took us 
into the back room, which bustled with activity. Large charts on the 
wall indicated the location of and assignments for a fleet of trucks 
that the owner operated as an informal adjunct to his copying firm. 
“The copying business is properly registered and is subject to tax 
rates of about ninety percent. It makes no money and reports no 
earnings,” he said. “The copying firm is the front for my trucking 
business, which is not registered and is the main source of my 
income.”  
We learned that well over two-thirds of trucking in Benin was 
conducted by “informals” whose presence the state had to tolerate 
lest the transport sector in the country collapse. Seen one way, this 
permitted the development of a crucial transport infrastructure in the 
country. Yet the tax rates and other onerous regulatory hurdles 
stunted the growth of what could be a far more effective system for 
moving goods throughout the country. If trucking companies entered 
the formal sector, they would have recourse to financing and legal 
protection that would facilitate expansion. “I would buy more trucks 
and build better warehouse facilities if I my trucking business was 
registered and incorporated,” explained the owner of the copying 
shop.  
7. Communications 
For most of the 20th century, most jurisdictions relied on a single 
firm to provide telephone service. In return for a promise to serve the 
entire jurisdiction at reasonable rates, the incumbent telephone 
company was granted an exclusive franchise and protection from 
competitive entry. In many countries, businesses and individuals 
suffered lengthy waits—sometimes years—to obtain land-based 
lines. In the poorest jurisdictions, no more than twenty percent of 
residents had telephone service. 
Beginning in the 1960s, a series of technological innovations 
shook the foundations of the single–provider, regulated monopolist 
approach to telecommunications policy. Among the most important 
was the advent of mobile telephony, which created strong 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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possibilities for competition among rival mobile service providers. 
This development forced rich and poor jurisdictions alike to decide 
how many operators to license. 
Jamaica’s competition authority, the Fair Trading Commission, 
played a major role in this decision as an advocate before the 
country’s telecommunications regulator. The JFTC argued that the 
regulator should issue licenses to at least two service providers. 
Jamaica chose to issue multiple licenses and set in motion dramatic 
improvements in telecommunications services. Waiting times for new 
service plunged, availability soared, and even the poorest 
neighborhoods now enjoy mobile service. Business operators now 
enjoy prompt connections to suppliers and customers—a major 
source of improved productivity and customer satisfaction. In their 
personal lives, consumers now enjoy the ability to speak by phone 
with friends and family members with far less difficulty than when 
land-based lines were the only telecommunications technology. The 
introduction of competition in mobile telephone has generated broad 
economic and social gains in Jamaica, and the economically 
disadvantaged have benefited significantly.  
B. The Contributions of Competition Policy 
The discussion above has suggested how a competition policy 
program can eliminate artificial private and public restrictions on 
competition. Through the enforcement of laws that forbid private or 
public restraints on business rivalry, the competition authority can 
dismantle barriers to new business development and play a major role 
in improving the availability of goods and services to poor 
populations. Through the use of its research and advocacy tools, the 
competition agency can identify barriers to competition and seek to 
persuade legislatures and regulatory bodies to adopt measures—such 
as the introduction of competition into the commercial airline 
sector—that yield important economic and social benefits. 
III. CONSUMER PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC DISADVANTAGE 
Consumer protection laws are important complements to 
competition policy. Perhaps the most valuable contribution of a 
consumer protection program is giving consumers confidence in the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol25/iss1/7
p 101 Kovacic book pages.doc  5/23/2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007]  Competition Policy 115 
 
 
marketplace by preventing serious fraud. False advertising and 
deceptive marketing practices can damage the capacity of honest 
merchants to attract consumers and create the perception that market-
based economic systems are fundamentally unreliable. If individuals 
fear they are prone to being cheated in many or most ordinary 
transactions, they will be inclined to take costly precautions and will 
end up purchasing less. 
Some policing of fraud involves purely local commerce. In Nepal 
we discovered that one of the most important concerns of consumers 
was short-weighting in retail establishments. Consumers feared that 
merchants frequently manipulated scales when measuring products 
such as rice and vegetables, even though one would expect local 
merchants to work hard to create good reputations with the clientele 
whose repeat business was necessary for their survival. One could see 
how public inspection programs or certification by non-government 
trade associations would identify wrongdoers and allay broader 
concerns about the integrity of retailing. 
Other challenges involve cross-border trade in the form of 
telemarketing or internet commerce. The telecommunications 
revolution has greatly reduced the cost of committing fraud. In an 
earlier era, the wrongdoer would have to visit possible victims, post 
notices, buy advertisements in print or broadcast media, or mail 
flyers. The internet makes it possible to reach large audiences at 
considerably lower cost. The typical internet fraud scheme—be it a 
promise of miracle cures for grave diseases, astonishing weight loss 
remedies, identity theft schemes such as phishing, or phony business 
opportunity promotions—is carried out by individuals or groups who 
are technologically proficient, geographically mobile, and attuned to 
gaps in cross-border enforcement arrangements. From our experience 
at the FTC, it is evident that they exchange what might be called 
worst practices in their efforts to increase the effectiveness of fraud. 
Economically disadvantaged groups can be especially vulnerable 
to such misconduct. They may be less likely to report apparent fraud 
to public authorities because they do not know where to turn or may 
lack confidence in the willingness to public bodies to address their 
concerns. In some cases in the United States, wrongdoers target 
populations who principally speak a language other than English and 
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occupy the lower strata of the income distribution. The language 
asymmetry makes these victims still less likely to report fraud. 
Consumer protection authorities have come to realize the need to 
develop special programs to address fraud and other consumer 
protection concerns among economically disadvantaged populations. 
In the United States, recent examples include the FTC’s creation of 
program that seeks to identify fraud directed toward those who 
mainly or only speak Spanish. Over the past decade, the FTC also has 
devoted increasing scrutiny to financial services programs that focus 
heavily on low income individuals. Many jurisdictions have 
increased educational programs to assist poor populations to take 
precautions that will reduce the success of fraudulent representations. 
There is also a growing awareness that consumer protection agencies 
should devote more resources to studying commerce in poor 
communities as a way of identifying misconduct, increasing the 
reporting of fraud to enforcement authorities, and establishing more 
effective education programs. 
IV. CONCLUSION: THE LARGER HUMAN DIMENSION 
I began this Essay by suggesting that effective competition policy 
and consumer protection programs offered two major types of 
benefits for economically disadvantaged populations: greater 
economic prosperity and higher levels of individual satisfaction. In 
the discussion above, I have dwelled mainly on the first. Here I want 
to close by relating two experiences that focus on the second theme. 
In many journeys, I have seen how the elimination of barriers to 
entrepreneurship yields gains that go beyond higher incomes for the 
poor. In one trip to Vietnam, I spent time in Mai Chao, a village near 
the border of Laos. This region had been, and still was, a major rice-
growing region. Vietnam’s economic reforms had facilitated the 
creation of new businesses, and a number of Mai Chao’s inhabitants 
had formed small businesses to weave carpets, garments, and wall 
hangings. The small enterprises used traditional designs and built 
upon skills that previously had been applied for local consumption 
only. The output of the weavers had attracted a growing and 
enthusiastic clientele of tourists and traders. 
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I interviewed some of the weavers and asked them what they 
thought of their new line of work. Many commented favorably on 
their success and welcomed the change that had taken them from the 
rice paddies to the looms. One woman captured a theme that ran 
through many of my conversations. She relished the switch from rice 
farming to weaving because she enjoyed weaving and delighted at the 
opportunity to apply new designs and experiment with new colors in 
preparing the fabrics. Working through a translator makes one 
cautious in attributing great significance to any single word or 
comment. All the same, she and many others spoke of their new line 
of work as giving fuller expression to skills and talents that gave 
them pleasure to exercise. The small businesses gave them a chance 
to explore possibilities that a lifetime in the rice fields never would 
permit.  
My second perspective deals partly with economic disadvantage 
and more universally with the capacity of access to the market to 
serve larger social ends. My best day in advising emerging market 
economies took place in Egypt in the late 1990s. We interviewed 
furniture makers in Alexandria to understand new business 
development in the country. Our counterparts told us of the modern 
evolution of their shops in the wake of national policies that had 
reduced regulatory obstacles to the creation of small firms and had 
permitted greater trade with Israel. They explained how their 
relationship with Israeli merchants had begun at a trade fair where 
Israeli representatives of a distribution network examined the 
Egyptians’ furniture and raised possibilities for selling the furniture 
in Israel. 
“At first we approached them very warily,” said our Egyptian 
counterparts. “After all, these were the Jews from Israel. It was now 
legal for us to discuss commercial ties, but not socially suitable. But 
we talked to them anyway.” From these tentative beginnings, a 
commercial relationship developed. The Egyptians provided the 
furniture, and the Israelis distributed it to retailers in Israel. The 
Israelis saw that the Egyptians make good furniture, and the 
Egyptians saw that the Israelis did a good job of marketing it. The 
Egyptians described a gradual transformation: “The Israelis went 
from being the Jews to being our partners. And they became our 
friends. Oh yes, we made a lot of money in the process.” 
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In our lives as consumers, it is difficult to have repeated enjoyable 
encounters with a product or service without having some respect for 
the people who create and provide it. As those encounters increase, I 
have faith that the respect will grow as well on both an individual and 
aggregate level.  
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